

- 제목: "압축적 근대성과 사회체제적 정상위기"



- 장경섭
- Chang Kyung-Sup
- *The Risk of Compressed Modernity* (Polity, 2025)
- https://www.politybooks.com/bookdetail?book_slug=the-risk-of-compressed-modernity--9781509560486 (Polity Press)
- https://www.google.co.kr/books/edition/The_Risk_of_Compressed_Modernity/OZxwEQAAQBAJ?hl=ko&gbpv=1&dq=The+Logic+of+Compressed+Modernity&pg=PA1985&printsec=frontcover (Google Books)
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해방 이후부터 현재에 이르기까지 한국사회는 폭발적 산업화 및 경제성장, 각종 사회제도의 급속한 설립과 개변, 이념과 문화의 전방위적 다원화, 범세계적 문물의 도입·활용·소비 등에 걸쳐 세계적 차원에서 미증유인 강도, 범위, 속도의 변화를 겪어 왔으며. 이러한 변화들은 '압축근대성(compressed modernity)'으로 개념화될 수 있다. 이러한 압축근대성은 한국인들의 삶과 국가의 사회체제적 성격을 강제적으로 규정한 자유주의 국제질서 속에서 민주주의적 사회·정치 질서와 자본주의적 경제·사회 질서를 기본 틀로 삼아 실현되었고, 이를 위해 민주주의 및 자본주의가 기본 사회체제로서 일거에 정치적 선포의 형식을 통해 확립(도입)되었다.

서구의 장구한 역사 속에서 지속적 문물교류, 치열한 내부투쟁, 복잡한 시행착오를 거쳐 오늘날의 형태로 완성된 민주주의 사회·정치 질서와 자본주의 경제·사회 질서를 한국 내부로 정치·행정적 과정에 기초해서 압축적으로 '제도적 동형화(institutional isomorphism)'시킬 수는 있었지만, 그렇다고 그 결과물로서 한국 민주주의와 자본주의가 즉각 제대로 작동하여 의도된 사회적 효용들을 적절히 실현시켜 줄 것으로 기대할 수는 없었다. 즉 제도적 형식을 넘어 실체·실효적 사회체제로서의 민주주의와 자본주의는 여전히 실현되어야 할 역사적 목표였지만, 당장의 현실은 한국인들과 국가 및 사회로 하여금 민주주의와 자본주의를 즉각적 수단으로서 활용해 시민들의 일상적 삶을 관리하고 국가 및 사회의 제도적 필요들을 충족시켜 나가도록 요구했다.

이러한 제도적 현실 속에서 경제, 사회, 정치, 문화, 지식 등에 걸쳐 전방위적으로 발현된 압축근대성에는 '위험질서'로서의 구조적 속성이 광범위하게 배태되어 있었다. 따라서 원래 의도된 사회적 효용들이 실현되려면 (민주주의와 자본주의를 벗어나거나 왜곡시키는) 갖가지 제도외적 노력이 일상화되어야 했고, 궁극적으로는 민주주의와 자본주의 자체에 대한 현실적이고 체계적인 재확립 노력이 지속적으로 이어져야 했다. 이러한 현실에 대한 체계적 이해와 실천적 극복 노력은 압축근대적 민주주의와 자본주의가 본원적인 위험질서로서 갖는 구조적 속성에 대한 종합적이고 체계적인 사회과학적 분석을 요구하며, 본 저술연구는 그러한 필요에 부응하기 위한 것이다. 요컨대, 압축근대성 시각에서 현대 한국의 중심 사회체제 및 그 만성적 위기상태에 대한 체계적 분석과 비판이 필수적이다. 이 책은 현대 한국의 실체(역사)적 민주주의 정치·사회 질서와 자본주의 사회·경제 질서가 미증유의 폭발적인 사회근대화와 경제발전 이면에서 구조화시켜 온 사회체제적 특수성과 불안정성을 종합적으로 포착하고 분석한다.

- **The Logic and Risk of Compressed Modernity: East Asia and Beyond**
- Chang Kyung-Sup, Professor of Sociology, Seoul National University
- **Abstract**
- In many East Asian societies, modernization and development have taken place in an extremely compressed fashion, achieving West-comparable aspects and levels of modernity in several decades, not over centuries. Such achievement of East Asian societies in quick and extensive modernization and rapid economic growth, however, have also harbored unexpected risks and costs that tend to threaten their stable further development. The very mechanisms and strategies that have made their explosive modernization and development possible often keep producing existentially hazardous consequences in virtually all areas of public and private life and serious obstacles to sustained advances in the future. However, such risks and contradictions in turn have served as crucial impetus for structural reforms and adaptations, opening up the possibility for the kind of radical change that Ulrich Beck described as 'the metamorphosis of the world'. Focusing on East Asian experiences and beyond, the speaker will presents an analytical account of the contexts, conditions, structures, and consequences of compressed modernity. In particular, the lecture will introduce various key substances of the recent two books, *The Logic of Compressed Modernity* (Polity, 2022) and *The Risk of Compressed Modernity* (Polity, forthcoming in 2024).





서울대학교 규장각한국학연구원 한국학연구총서 41

민주주의·자본주의·압축근대성 한국의 사회체제적 정상위기

장경섭 지음



서울대학교출판문화원

제1부 민주주의, 자본주의, 압축근대성

- 1장. 압축근대성과 사회체제적 정상위기
- 2장. 압축근대적 자유주의의 규범체계

제2부 압축근대적 민주주의의 정상위기


- 3장. 국가투사주의 정치와 현실 민주주의의 물사회성
- 4장. 시민사회와 국민사회
- 5장. 삼목민주화, 압축산업화, 노동(계급)정치
- 6장. 압축근대성, 가족화된 자유주의, 권위주의 생활세계

제3부 압축근대적 자본주의의 정상위기

- 7장. 국가자본주의 산업화와 재벌체제
- 8장. 개발자유주의, 개발시민권, 사회(시민)권
- 9장. 산업생산 극대화, 사회재생산 붕괴
- 10장. 복합위협사회: '선성장 후안전'

제4부 전망

- 11장. 재근대화, 급진다원화혁명, 혹은 해방적 파국?



The Logic of Compressed Modernity ↵

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Preface ↵

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Part I. Compressed Modernity in Perspective ↵

Chapter 1. Introduction ↵

Chapter 2. Compressed Modernity: Constitutive Dimensions and Manifesting Units ↵

Chapter 3. Compressed Modernity in the Universalist Perspective ↵

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Part II. Structural Properties of Compressed Modernity ↵

Chapter 4. Internal Multiple Modernities: South Korea as Multiplex Theater Society

Chapter 5. Transformative Contributory Rights: Citizen(ship) in Compressed Modernity ↵

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Chapter 7. Productive Maximization, Reproductive Meltdown ↵

Chapter 8. Social Institutional Deficits and Infrastructural Familialism ↵

Chapter 9. The Demographic Configuration of Compressed Modernity ↵

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Part III. After Compressed Modernity ↵

Chapter 10. The Post-Compressed Modern Condition ↵

The Risk of Compressed Modernity[←]

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Preface [←]

Introduction: Compressed Modernity and Its Structural Risks [←]

Part I. Democracy, Capitalism, Social Class[←]

1. Borrowed Democracy, State-Projective Politics, and Institutional Functional Conflations

2. Normal Corruption: Utilitarian Institutional Dualities and Technocratized Authoritarian (In)justice [←]

3. Class Contradictions of State Capitalist Industrialism: The “Chaebol Republic” [←]

4. The Proletarian Predicament of Developmental Compression: Social Conditions of Flexibly Complex Capitalism [←]

Part II. Culture, Family, Life Risk[←]

5. Reflexive Postcoloniality: Intellectual and Cultural Contradictions of Compressed Modernity [←]

6. Compressed Modernity, Gender, and Obfuscated Family Crisis: Individualization without Individualism [←]

7. Complex Risk Society: Risk Components of Compressed Modernity [←]

Part III. Prospect[←]

8. A Beckian Metamorphosis? [←]

• **[1] Compressed Modernity: Definition**

- Compressed modernity is a civilizational condition in which economic, political, social, and/or cultural changes occur in an extremely condensed manner in respect to both time and space, and in which the dynamic coexistence of mutually disparate historical and social elements leads to the construction and reconstruction of a highly complex and fluid social system. Compressed modernity can be manifested at various levels of human existence – that is, personhood, family, secondary organizations, urban spaces, societal units (including civil society, nation, etc.), and, not least important, the global society. At each of these levels, compressed modernity necessitates people's lives to be managed intensely, intricately, and flexibly in order to remain normally integrated with the rest of society. Compressed modernity is thereby subjected to a mutual escalation effect among such different levels.




Figure 1.1 Five dimensions of compressed modernity.

- **[2] Varieties and Multiplicities of Compressed Modernity**
- **[2-1] Global Varieties of Compressed Modernity:**
 - Historical / Structural / Systemic / Situational
- **[2-2] (National) Internal Multiple Modernities: South Korea as Multiplex Theatre Society**
 - Colonial Dialectical Modernity
 - Postcolonial Reflexive Institutional(ist) Modernization
 - Postcolonial Neotraditionalist Modernity
 - The Cold War and Free World Modernity
 - State-Capitalist Modernity and National Developmentalism
 - Neoliberal Economic Globalism and Cosmopolitan Modernity
 - Civil Society's Subaltern Liberal Modernity in the Making
- **[2-3] Theory of Modernization vs. Theory of *Modernization***

- **[3] Structural Properties of Compressed Modernity**
- **[3-1] Citizenship in Compressed Modernity: Transformative Contributory Rights**
- In postcolonial and post-war South Korea, while both the state and civil society were unstable with their own survival remaining in question, the internal conditions and international environments required them to embark on, among other changes, rapid institutional and techno-scientific modernization and aggressive economic development. In fact, such transformations were often pursued in order to strategically trounce the sociopolitical dilemmas stemming from the inchoate, dependent, and even illegitimate nature of the state machinery and dominant social order. There have arisen transformation-oriented state, society, and population for which each transformation becomes an ultimate purpose in itself, the processes and means of the transformations constitute the main sociopolitical order, and the transformation-embedded interests form the core social identity. In this milieu, a distinct mode of citizenship has been engendered in terms of transformative contributory rights. **Citizenship as transformative contributory rights can be defined as effective and/or legitimate claims to national and social resources, opportunities, and/or respects that accrue to citizens' contributions to the nation's or society's transformative purposes.** As South Korea has been aggressively and precipitously engaged in institutional and techno-scientific modernization, economic development, political democratization, economic and sociocultural globalization, and, mostly recently, ethno-national reformation, its citizens have been exhorted or have exhorted themselves to intensely engage in each of these transformations, and their citizenship, constituted by identities, duties, and rights, have been very much framed and substantiated by the conditions, processes, and outcomes of such transformative engagements.
- **#Development as state capitalist industrialism and developmental citizenship**
- **#Reproductive citizenship: reproductive contributory rights and pronatal welfarism**

- **[3-2] Productive Maximization, Reproductive Meltdown**
- In South Korea (and other East Asian societies), compressed modernity is to a critical extent the process and outcome of the developmental(ist) political economy that has been forcefully initiated from above (i.e., by the state), yet actively accommodated from below (i.e., by ordinary citizens). Modernity was conceived in a fundamentally developmentalist or *productionist* manner, so modernization principally became the politico-social project of achieving time-condensed economic development and thereby joining the world rank of "advanced nations". Such purposeful approach to modernity in terms of condensed national development has been substantiated by various policies, actions, and attitudes that are designed to maximize economic production and, not coincidentally, to systematically sacrifice the conditions and processes of social reproduction. After decades of successful economic development, such asymmetrical approach to production and reproduction seems to have critically lost its instrumentality. In spite of their enviable façade covered with hyper-advanced industries, physical infrastructures, services, and lifestyles, the civilizational and even economic progress of South Korean society is now crucially impeded by the disenfranchisement and demise of those classes, generations, communities, cultures, and wisdoms that have been treated practically as *disposables*, unworthy of social reproduction support, under the narrowly focused developmental political economies.
- **#State socialist industrialism vs. catch-up capitalist industrialism**
- **#Developmentalist state vs. developmentalist family**

- **[3-3] Social Institutional Deficits and Infrastructural Familialism**
 - In a fundamentally family-dependent way, South Koreans have managed their modern history and made various internationally envious achievements. The compressed nature of their modernity is structurally enmeshed with various social infrastructural utilities of families. This feature of South Korean society has been derived not just from its traditional – say, neo-Confucian – heritage of family-centered life, but more critically from the processes and manners by which South Koreans have coped with various modern sociocultural, political and economic forces. Even after the state managed to effectively govern national economic development and social institutional modernization, South Koreans' reliance on familial norms, relations, and resources have remained unabated. In fact, the familialized nature of South Korean modernity has kept intensifying, albeit in continually refashioning modes, as the state and its allied social actors have found and consciously tapped various strategic utilities from ordinary people's eager effort to sustain their family-centered/devoted lives. This has been evident concerning nearly all major features and conditions of South Korean development and modernization, such as **(1) early Lewisian industrialization based upon stable supplies of rural migrant labor, (2) universalization of high-level public education enabling constant improvements in human capital, and (3) sustained common ethic for familial support and care buffering chronically defective public welfare**. The state's own practically driven familialist stance is not reducible to sheer private family values, but represents a distinct line of technocratic deliberation, conceptualized here as *infrastructural familialism*. Conversely, the state's such utilitarian familialism has made individual citizens realize that their developmental and sociopolitical participation in national life is systematically facilitated through familial allegiance and cooperation. **Infrastructural familialism has been upheld both from above and from below.**

- **[3-4] Knowledge and Culture in Reflexive Compressed Modernity**
- The vague manifestation and largely unclear effect of Asian culture and philosophy in modern societal transformations do not necessarily imply that Asian societies and citizens have instead incorporated Western culture and philosophy earnestly for such transformations. The ideology of *dongdoseogi* (Eastern spirit, Western machine) seems to have at least justified a broad tendency of instrumentalism under which the utilization of Western knowledge, technology, goods, and social institutions intentionally omits or conveniently bypasses the deep understanding and accommodation of the essential cultural and philosophical foundations of such matters in the Western context. In reality, West-reflexive instrumentalist modernization in South Korea and elsewhere has induced the concerned nations to balk on their own traditional culture and philosophy in the public domain. (At the private level, nonetheless, the universal neo-Confucianization in family norms and relations, paradoxically under the formal abolition of the Confucian gentry status, helped to widely and crucially complement the public waning of the traditional sociocultural order.) Thereby arose a historical process of *aphilosophical modernization* and development in which the nationalist goal of catching up with the West became a surrogate philosophy in itself, and the technocratic rules and means have kept replacing or overriding the moral concerns and civilizational considerations of civil society whether West-centered or indigenous. In an ironic consequence of the broad disembedding (or even nullification) of culture and philosophy from the institutional and material order, South Korean society and people have been exposed to nearly unconstrained varieties of culture, however, in routinely reifying settings and formats. **The remarkable diversity and plurality of cultural experiences have been ironically conditioned upon the practical irrelevance of culture and philosophy in the institutional and material world. At the social level, culture and philosophy have routinely been bypassed as purely superstructural objects, so that their diversity and plurality would not disturb the dominant sociopolitical and political economic order.**

- **[4] Structural Risks of Compressed Modernity**
- **[4-1] Cuttage Democracy, State-Projective Politics, Institutional Functional Conflations**
- South Korea's postcolonial political departure as a full representative democratic system was based upon a sort of reflexive institutional declaration in conjunction with its subjection to American influences. Paradoxically, this seemingly celebratory political process was predicated upon a violent suppression, instead of a serious bolstering, of civil society. This crucially reflected the strategic international politico-military necessity for firmly establishing a hegemonic status of liberal (reads conservative) pro-American sociopolitical forces in the immediate post-liberation period. Formal democracy's social representation has thereafter been replaced by a sort of statist self-representation. In order to be qualified for formal representation in the national and local political arenas, citizens, classes, and communities have had to prove their compliance with various ideological and political criteria set by the self-imposing conservative state. Despite their arduous sociopolitical struggle for (re)democratization against a series of military and civilian autocracies, South Korean citizens, on the one hand, have realized that democracy is not necessarily a genuine institution for representing citizens' autonomous values, interests, and demands in a bottom-up manner, and, on the other hand, have been accustomed to being mobilized, directed, and even regimented by the authoritative (and often authoritarian) state in pursuing various supposedly national goals superimposed in a top-down manner. **A sort of state-projective politics has routinely prevailed in the everyday operation of political institutions and administrative organs (of a supposedly representative polity), which in turn have been strategically assisted by legal, journalistic, and academic collaborators with widespread political ambitions.** The chronically nullified or neutralized authority of the parliament has been detested not only by opposition politicians and parties, but also by conscious citizens and intellectuals, many of whom would devote themselves in organizing social movements and organizations as complementary, if not substitutive, political instruments for society's self-representation into the work of the state. Besides, many newspapers and broadcasts have quite frequently appointed themselves as in-effect political parties in covering virtually all kinds and areas of news with strong political and/or ideological insistences that often reflect their own, frequently partisan, political interests and orientations.

• [4-2] Normal Corruption: Utilitarian Institutional Dualities and Technocratized Authoritarian (In)justice

- South Korea's liberal systemic modernity has been pervasively and chronically contaminated (and distorted) by the virtually normalized structures and practices of corruption shared among the mainstream actors and organizations in economic production and social services. Postcolonial/ neocolonial reflexive modernization has usually taken on an institutionalist nature in that most of related efforts have been centered upon institutional emulation or replication of the politico-legal, economic, and social systems of "advanced nations" (seonjunguk). However, reflexively adopted Western institutions in political, economic, and social affairs do not necessarily enable to solve the impending material and organizational exigencies in most of the postcolonial societies populated by exploited and deprived grassroots citizens and devoid of stable and sound conditions of economic production and social provision. In fact, the simulated or emulated Western social institutions – such as market economy, democracy, and social citizenship – are the long historical outcome of the concerned Western societies' arduous efforts, struggles, and achievements in encountering and solving wide-ranged and incessantly varied material and organizational exigencies conflated with politico-military, racial, and ecological challenges. In other words, most of postcolonial South Korea's immediate, and even long-term, material exigencies of economic production and social provision have had to be acquired through various self-taught/learned measures, causing or necessitating very flexible coordination, compromise, distortion, or even nullification of West-reflexive formal institutions in public governance and socioeconomic life. In the long run, as it has turned out, South Korea has ended up establishing an effectively functioning, yet socio-politically vulnerable and chronically unlawful, system of industrial capitalism and social provisioning that effect its liberal order's endemic legitimization crisis. **A general systemic order of normal corruption has thereby prevailed under the pervasively utilitarian institutional dualities between the West-reflexively adopted liberal institutions and the practically devised methods and improvised orders for pragmatic and expedient problem-solving, often beyond legal boundaries or principles.** The state's judicial organs – prosecution in particular – have not functioned to simply incriminate such systemic corruption but to carefully reflect practical national and/or social utilities in flexibly ignoring or pardoning its legal problems, whereas news media have tried to deliver their own verdicts on both sides of corruption, that is, unlawful practices in problem-solving and arbitrary (non-)adjudication on them.

- **[4-3] The Proletarian Predicament of Developmental Compression: (Neoliberal vs.) Developmental Capitalist Precariatization**
- Most of South Korea's working population have undergone chronic vulnerabilities and instabilities in job status not just under the recent incidents of the national financial crisis and the concomitant neoliberal economic restructuring but also during the initial phase of rapid capitalist industrialization and the latest phase of sustained industrial re(up)structuring into the most advanced sectors. The so-called lifetime employment system was unrealizable and often undermined in South Korea's success in a miracle-paced industrialization. That is, the actual working life course of South Korean men should be viewed first in the context of unprecedentedly rapid capitalist industrialization (and deindustrialization) because their society continually saw radical structural changes to its industries. A series of breath-taking shifts have taken place – from agriculture to labor-intensive industries to capital-intensive industries to ICT and advanced service industries. The fact that these changes all have occurred within a few decades, the length of an individual's occupational life, suggests that most workers have inevitably encountered chronic job instabilities. The national financial crisis on the eve of the new millennium critically intensified domestic labor displacement as South Korean industries instantaneously transnationalized their production platform across Asia on top of radical domestic labor reshuffling. As an accompanying result, South Koreans' (already heavy) concentration in self-employment (mostly in petty tertiary sectors) has become incomparably high after decades of miracle-paced industrialization. Unlike the popular characterization of the East Asian labor regimes, lifetime employment has been an exceptional privilege for a tiny minority of the South Korean working population due to its radical success, not failure, in industrial progression and globalization. The dominance of the uniquely illiberal bourgeoisie (chaebol), coupled with the pervasively transitory proletariat, has led to the deformed class relations or structure in the economic order and representative politics that deviates from the normally expected sociopolitical platform of liberal modernity.

- **[4-4] Familialized Compressed Modernity and (Women's) Individualization without Individualism**
 - South Korean families have functioned as a highly effective receptacle for the nation's highly compressed conditions of modernity and late modernity. It is as much due to the success of South Korean families as an engine of compressed modernity as due to their failure that they have become functionally overloaded and socially risk-ridden. Such familial burdens and risks have been particularly onerous to South Korean women because of the fundamentally gender-based structure of family relations and duties that has in part been recycled from the (neo-)Confucian past and in part manufactured under industrial capitalism. Under these complicated conditions, South Korean women have had to dramatically restructure their family relations and duties as well as their individual life choices. Furthermore, under the most recent condition of what Ulrich Beck dubbed second modernity, other institutions of modernity, such as the state, industrial economy, firms, unions, schools, and welfare systems, have become increasingly ineffective in helping to alleviate such (gender-based) familial burdens and dilemmas. As a result, South Korean women have experienced dramatic changes in marriage patterns, fertility, family relations, and so forth. **South Korean women's individualization has thereby taken place primarily as a matter of practicality rather than ideational change.** A brief analysis of the situations in the neighboring societies of Japan and Taiwan reinforces the conclusion that individualization without individualism, particularly among women, is a region-wide phenomenon in East Asia, notwithstanding its multifarious manifestations reflecting each nation's complex sociocultural particularities.

- **[5] Compressed Modernity: South Korea vs. East Asia**
- **# The Aperture of Similarities and Diversities in Sociodemographic Instability:**
- **# South Korea / Japan / Taiwan / China (cf. Sasano Misae)**
-