The second session of the 1st International Conference for Contemporary Korean Studies, organized by the Seoul National University Contemporary Korea Research Group, was held under the title “Political Economy from a Comparative-Historical Perspective.” Six presentations were delivered by Stephen Haggard (University of California, San Diego), Yong-Chool Ha (University of Washington), Keun Lee (Seoul National University), Elizabeth Thurbon (University of New South Wales), Yin-wah Chu (Hong Kong Baptist University), and Jaeyong Song (Seoul National University). The speakers revisited the established themes of the developmental state and late industrialization in Korean political economy in light of new conditions including low growth, democratization, industrial policy, technological innovation, the green transition, and economic security.

Stephen Haggard, in “Lineages of the Developmental State: New Evidence, New Policies,” examined contemporary Korean political economy against a changing international environment characterized by the slowing of globalization, the return of industrial policy, and the increasing securitization of trade and investment. As strategic competition between the United States and China intensifies, issues such as supply-chain resilience, economic dependence on China, export controls on advanced technologies, and semiconductor industrial policy have become increasingly important for Korea. Haggard also highlighted the emergence of new forms of cooperation among smaller groups of states focused on specific technologies and security concerns alongside the weakening of the traditional multilateral trading order. In this context, the US–ROK alliance is expanding beyond military security to encompass semiconductors, artificial intelligence, public health, and supply chains.

Yong-Chool Ha, in “Distinctiveness of South Korea’s Modernization: Tradition as a Bridge Between Political Economy and Sociology,” examined the paradoxical coexistence of an ultramodern industrial economy with the persistence of traditional social ties such as kinship, school, and regional networks. He conceptualized this phenomenon in terms of “neofamilism,” arguing that the rapid pursuit of late industrialization encouraged the state to mobilize familiar social relationships and values. As state bureaucracies and chaebol organizations repeatedly relied on networks combining merit with regional, educational, and personal ties, these forms of social organization were reinforced rather than simply displaced by modernization. Ha therefore called for an approach that connects political economy and sociology by examining not only the economic achievements of the developmental state but also how industrialization transformed the state and society themselves.

Keun Lee, presenting joint research with Djun Kil Kim in “Compressed Development, Decompression, and Diverging Convergence in South Korea: Which Varieties of Capitalism in Contemporary Korea?,” examined the long-term transformation of Korean capitalism through the concepts of compressed development, decompression, and “diverging convergence.” Korea’s rapid growth under the developmental state was followed by democratization and market liberalization, particularly after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Contemporary Korea, Lee argued, increasingly resembles Anglo-American capitalism in terms of slower growth and rising inequality, while displaying characteristics associated with other capitalist models in social outcomes and labour-market policy. Korea therefore appears to be moving away from the classic East Asian high-growth model without fully converging on any single Western variety of capitalism.

Elizabeth Thurbon, presenting joint research with Alexander M. Hynd in “Green Energy Statecraft in the Indo-Pacific: New Rules at the Techno-Industrial Frontier,” introduced the concept of “green energy statecraft” to explain changing forms of state intervention amid the overlapping challenges of climate change, energy transition, strategic competition between the United States and China, and supply-chain security. Green energy policies and institutions, she argued, are increasingly mobilized not simply to meet environmental or industrial objectives but also to strengthen economic, energy, environmental, and even military security.

Thurbon observed that South Korea has placed considerable emphasis on domestically oriented green energy statecraft through sectors such as smart grids, electric vehicles, and green hydrogen, while also expanding external green-energy partnerships. At the same time, both Korea and other countries pursuing rapid energy transitions face the challenge of building sufficient social and political consensus to support the move away from fossil fuels. Green transformation, in this sense, involves not only the creation of new industries but also the reorganization of economic strategy, international partnerships, financial systems, and domestic political coalitions.

Yin-wah Chu, in “The Developmental States of South Korea and Taiwan: Core Features and Divergent Trajectories,” reconsidered the tendency to treat Korea and Taiwan as examples of a single East Asian developmental-state model. Although both governments played active roles in economic development, their policy instruments and state–business relations differed substantially. South Korea pursued more concentrated support for selected industries and large corporations, while Taiwan relied more heavily on smaller exporters, state enterprises, and different forms of public-private coordination. Chu argued that these differences cannot be understood solely through state institutions, but must also be situated within the distinct social structures and geopolitical conditions of the two societies.

Democratization, globalization, the rise of China, and the growing capabilities of private firms have reduced the direct control once associated with the classic developmental state. Yet governments in both Korea and Taiwan continue to exercise significant influence through R&D funding, regulation, industrial roadmaps, and other policy instruments. The developmental state, Chu suggested, has therefore not simply disappeared; rather, it has adapted to changing circumstances in different ways, with the distinctive social and geopolitical conditions of Korea and Taiwan continuing to produce divergent developmental trajectories.

Finally, Jaeyong Song, in “Evolution of Technology Sourcing Strategies of Korean Electronics Companies: The Case of Samsung Electronics,” examined how Korean latecomer firms overcame technological disadvantages to become global leaders in industries such as electronics and semiconductors. Korean companies initially relied on strategies of reverse engineering, licensing, and imitation, but gradually combined these approaches with internal R&D, overseas research centers, the recruitment of internationally trained engineers, and other forms of external technology sourcing. Samsung Electronics provides a particularly important example of this transition from a “fast follower” to a technological leader.

Song argued, however, that the traditional fast-follower model has become increasingly difficult to sustain amid stronger intellectual-property protection, competition from Chinese firms, and changes in the Korean labour market and younger generations’ attitudes toward work. Korean companies therefore face the challenge of moving from creative imitation toward genuine innovation by developing new organizational capabilities, expanding global R&D networks, pursuing open innovation, and using venture investment and mergers and acquisitions to access emerging technologies.

The presentations were followed by an open discussion addressing the return of industrial policy in the United States and Korea, the role of Chinese industrial policy in this shift, changing relationships between corporations and workers across generations, and the persistence or weakening of traditional social ties in contemporary Korea. Participants also debated whether the transformation of Korean capitalism should be understood primarily in terms of “convergence.” Particular attention was paid to the difficulty of classifying a system that increasingly displays characteristics of liberal market economies while simultaneously expanding welfare policies and retaining significant forms of state coordination.

The discussion further explored differences between the developmental trajectories of Korea and Taiwan, the effects of democratization on industrial and distributive policy, and the characteristics of Korea’s green energy transition. Toward the end of the session, Korea’s exceptionally low birth rate was raised as a major political-economic challenge closely connected to labour-market participation, gender inequality, care provision, and future economic growth. Participants also noted that demographic decline may ultimately require debates over immigration and the social integration of newcomers.

Taken together, the presentations moved beyond viewing the Korean developmental state simply as a successful model of past high growth and instead examined how its institutional and social legacies are being transformed under new domestic and international conditions. The persistence of traditional social relations and state–business coordination, the restructuring of Korean capitalism, the return of industrial policy amid US–China competition, the green transition, and changing strategies of technological innovation all point toward a common question: what kind of political-economic order is emerging in Korea after the era of catch-up and rapid growth? The session thus suggested that contemporary Korean political economy should be understood not as a fixed developmental model, but as an evolving configuration in which historically formed institutions interact with new global pressures and domestic social change.